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ABSTRACTS
Mary ltme Plumer
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-NECESSITY OF "FINDING" BY ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY ON "JURISDICTIONAL" QUESTION-The Interstate Commerce Act
confers upon the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to issue cer_tificates
of public convenie~ce and necessity allowing any carrier subject to the act to
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abandon "all or any portion" of its line of railroad.1 But the act also provides
that authority "shall not extend" to the abandonm_ent "of street, suburban, or
interurban electric railways, which are not operated as part or parts of a general
steam railroad system of transportation." 2 After a hearing, the Interstate Commerce Commission granted a certificate to the New York Central Railroad
Company authorizing it to abandon an electric branch line running between Van
Cortlandt Park Junction, New York City, and Getty Square, Yonkers, New
York,, because the operation of the line is an "undue and unnecessary" burden on
interstate commerce. The commission failed, however, to make any findings
concerning the issue of whether or not this electric branch line "operated as a
part or parts of a general steam railroad system of transportation" within the
meaning of § I ( 22) of the act. The question of jurisdiction was not raised at
the hearing but it was presented in petitions for reconsideration, which the commission denied. The district court reviewed the evidence and, relying on the
fact that passengers commuting between New York and Yonkers had to be _
transferred to other lines in order to get them into Grand Central Station, concluded that the operation of the electric branch line was "intertwined with the
operation of the system as a whole," and sustained the commission.3 Held,
versed. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, said, "Congress has
withheld from the Commission any power to authorize the abandonment of certain types of railroad lines. It is hardly enough to say that the Commission's
orders ~ay be set aside by the courts where the Commission extends its authority.
The Commission has a special competence to deal with the transportation problems which are reflected in these questions. The Congress has entrusted to the
Commission the initial responsibility for, determining through application of the
statutory standards the appropriate line between the federal and state domains....
The sacrifice of these legitimate local interests may be as readily achieved through
the Commission's oversight or neglect ..• as by improper findings. The insistence
that the Commission make these jurisdictional findings before it undertakes to act
not only gives added assurance that the local interest for which Congress expresses solicitude will be safeguarded. It also gives to the reviewing courts the
assistance of an expert judgment on a knotty phase of a technical subject." 4
Frankfurter, Reed and Jackson dissented. 5 City of Yonkers v. United States,
(U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 327. 6

re-

APPEARANCE-WHETHER DEPOSITION INTENDED TO BE USED ONLY AT
HEARING ON PLEA IN ABATEMENT MAY CONSTITUTE GENERAL APPEARANCE-In an action by plaintiff to recover on a loan, defendant appeared specially, filing a plea in abatement in which he claimed residence in California.
1 49 U.S.C. (1940) § 1(18), (19), (20), 24 Stat. L. 379 (1887), 41 Stat. L.
477-478 (1920).
2 49 u.s.c. (1940) § 1(22).
.
3 Public Service Commission of N.Y. v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 497 (1943).
4 Principal case at 3 3 l.
5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinipn based on the theory that a
formal finding by the commission on the jurisdictional point was necessary, but, if the
commission failed to make such finding, it was in order for the court to do so.
6 See 55 HARV. L. REv. 279 (1941) and annotation in 146 A.L.R. 209 (1943).
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The trial court rendered judgment that the action abate. From this judgment
plaintiff appeals, contending that defendant entered a general appearance because
he served notice to take a deposition "to be used in evidence on the trial of said
cause," 1 and the record shows that the deposition was published on his motion.
Held, judgment affirmed. Had the defendant intended to use the deposition in a
trial on the merits, then the motion to publish it might have constituted a general
appearance. Whether a defendant may make a general appearance by notice of
taking a deposition and the publication thereof depends on the purp~se for which
he intends to use it. At the time defendant's notice to take deposition was given
and the motion for publication was made, a plea in abatement was pending and
the contents of the deposition show -that it was "usable only and could have been
intended to be used only" 2 at the hearing on the plea in abatement. This· did
not constitute a general appearance. Donnelley v. Thome, (Ind. App. 1943) 5 I

N. E. (2d) 873.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-WILLS-APPLICABILITY OF LAW OF TESTATOR'S

His INTENT IN REGARD TO LAND SrruATED ELSEWHERE
-Humphrey R. Wagar, a resident of Michigan, died in 1916, leaving his property in trust, the income to go to his wife, his children and his four grandchildren, and the principal after the death of the survivor of his children, to be divided equally among his grandchildren and "in case of the death of any of said
grandchildren, prior to the time of the decease of the survivor of my children,
then and in such case, the share or shares of the said deceased grandchild shall be
divided among the legal heirs of said grandchild share and share alike." The
survivor of the children died in 1939, and one grandchild died in 1915, leaving
as survivors a full sister, plaintiff here, and a half brother, not a descendant of
testator, who is the defendant. Part of the property was in Michigan, part in the
District of Columbia. The question before this court is who, within the meaning
of the will, are the heirs of the deceased grandchild. The will was probated in
Michigan and the courts, after a series of trials and appeals,1 decided that the
legal heirs of the deceased grandchild are to be determined as of the time of the
death of the survivor of testator's children; and that the legal heirs as of that date
are the half brother and the full sister of the deceased grandchild.
This suit was filed in the District of Columbia to secure distribution of the
part of the residue located there, and the court came to the same result as to
District of Columbia property as the Michigan court reached as to Michigan
property. An appeal was taken by plaintiff who contends that the controlling
law as to the devolution of title and the determination of heirship is that of the
place where the land lies, at the time of the testator's death, and that that law
excludes half bloods from inheritance if a full blood is living unless the property
is from a common ancestor. Held, affirmed. The decision of the Michigan
court was not res judicata, for the rule is that the law of the situs of real property governs its descent, alienation, transfer, and _the effect and construction of
DoMICILE TO SHow

Principal case, p. 874.
Jd., p. 875.
1 In re Wagar's Estate, 292 Mich. 452, 290 N.W. 865 (1940); In re Wagar's
Estate, 295 Mich. 463, 295 N.W. 227 (1940); In re Wagar's Estate, 302 Mich. 243,
4 N.W. (2d) 535 (1942).
1

2
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wills and other conveyance_s. But the intent of the testator is paramount in all interpretations of wills, and "in discovering his intent, from the words used by him
in his will, the controlling meaning of such words are, generally those declared
by the law of testator's domicile." 2 The law of Michigan, with regard to the
facts here involved, has defined the word heirs to include half bloods. The word I
heirs as used in the testator's will describes the class of beneficiaries which is to
take and is a word of purchase, as distinguished from one of technical meaning
which must be determined by the law of the situs. Consequently, the Michigan
interpretation prevails. Greenwood v. Page, (D.C. App. 1943) 138 F. (2d)

921.a
CoNTRACTS-CHARIT,.;_BLE SuBscRIPTioNs-REQUIREMENT OF CoNsID-

ERATION-Henry A. and Nannie H. Floyd were solicited to make a contribution for Transylvania University, and when the Floyds professed an interest in
other charitable institutions supported by the Christiap. Church, the solicitor
drew up three documents in which the signer promised to pay a certain sum to
each of the three institutions, one the university, who are plaintiff-appellees here.
The notes were to come due sixty days after the death of the survivor of the
Floyds, who signed the notes. The consideration recited is the signer's interest in
Christian benevolence in one case and in Christian education in the other two
cases, and "the gifts and pledges of others" in all three cases. The Floyds are now
dead and appellees brought three actions, heard together here, against Henry
Floyd's executor on their promissbry notes, and obtained a judgment in the lower
court from which defendant-appellant appeals. The evidence failed to show either
that the Floyds induced others or were induced by others to subscribe, or that
the three institutions were induced to act or incur obligations on the strength
of the pledges in question but the chancellor held that the documents were not
testamentary and that they were supported by a valuable consideration. Appellant
claims that the documents are testamentary and therefore unenforceable for
want of the form,alities required for wills; or if they are promissory notes, they
are unenforceable for want of consideration. Held, reversed and remanded.
Mutual subscription is not valuable consideration, although the promise may be
binding when the agreement is between two contributors and the project is one
that depends on contributions for existence, or when it has been relied upon.
This court and others have, as a matter of public policy, gone out of their way to
hold s.uch charitable subscriptions good, but to hold this one good, without consideration, would amount to giving effect to a testamentary instrument without
requiring the requisite formalities, and would be against public policy. Floyd v.
Christian Church Widows and Orphans Home of Kentucky, (Ky. App. -1943)
176 S.W. (2d) 125.1
Principal case at 923-924.
On subject of law governing intent of testator, see note in 19 N.Y.Univ.L.Q.
216 (1942).
.
2

3

1 See "Contracts-Charitable Subscriptions-Consideration," 29 GEo. L. J. 245
(1940), 4 UNiv. NEWARK L. REV. 407 (1941); "Charitable Subscriptions-Adequacy
of Consideration and Definiteness of Promise," 27 M1cH. L. REv. 88 (1928); "Charitable Subscriptions-Promissory Estoppel," 22 MxcH. L. REv. 260 (1923), 23
M1cH. L. REv. 910 (1925).
I
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CRIMINAL LAw-INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL PROBATION AcT~
One Roberts pleaded guilty to a federal crime and the district court entered
judgment against him and sentenced him to serve two years in a federal penitentiary and to pay a $250 fine. The execution of sentence was suspended 'under
authority of the Probation Act,1 conditioned upon payment of the fine. The fine
was paid and Roberts was released on probation for a five-year period but, after
four years, the court held a hearing, revoked probation, set aside the original
sentence of two years and imposed a new three-year sentence. The circuit court
of appeals affirmed 2 and certiorari was granted. The question raised is whether,
under proper interpretation of the Probation Act, a judgment, the execution of
which has been postponed, may be set aside and a new judgment for a longer
period entered upon revocation of probation. Held, in the negative. Section one
of the act gives the court power "to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant upon probation .•••" 8 This was intended to
give the trial judge a choice between imposing sentence before probation is
granted and imposing it after probation is revoked. Section two says that the
court "may revoke the probation or the suspension of sentence, and may impose
any sentence which might originally have been imposed." To read this, as did
the government, as authorizing the trial court to impose any sentence wl)ich
might originally have been imposed, thereby implying power to revoke the old
sentence, is to eliminate one of the methods of imposing sentence defined in section one and render part of that section meaningless. Effect may be given to all
sections of the statute by construing it as not permitting an increase of a deflnite
term of imprisonment fixed by a prior valid sentence. Fl!rther, such construction is in accord with the legislative intent as shown by the history of the act, and
enables the courts to carry out the purpose of the act. Frankfurter, Stone and
Reed dissented. Roberts v. United States, (U.S. 1943) 64 S. Ct. 113.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF NoNCONTRABAND Goons ILLEGALLY OBTAINED-The defendants,
Richter Jewelers, Inc., the president and manager of the corporation, and a clerk
in the store, were charged with having published a misleading advertisement in
violation of section 421 of the Penal Law. 1 They were found guilty by the trial
court and the decision was affirmed by the appellate division. This appeal was
brought to challenge the admissability in evidence of merchandise consisting of
a ring and price tag which the defendants claimed had been unlawfully procured
by an inspector of weights and measures of the department of markets of the
City of New York. The defendants' claim is that the admissibility of such evidence is a violation of the rights, guaranteed by the Constitution of New York,
"to be secure . • . against unreasonable searches and seizures" 2 and not to be
compelled to testify against themselves. 3 They distinguish their case from Peo1
2
3

43 Stat. L. 1259-1261 (1925); 18 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 724-728.
131 F. (2d) 392 (1942).
43 Stat. L. 1259 (1925; 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 724. (Italics the Court's).

39 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938) art. 40, § 421.
2 id., art. I, § 12.
3 Id., art. 1, § 6.

1

2
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ple v. Defore,4 already decided on this point in New York, on the ground that
there the goods seized were contraband, while here they were articles lawfully
possessed by the defendant. Held, decision of the appellate division affirmed. For
the purpose of applying the rule that a court will not look into the manner in
·which evidence has been obtained in considering its admissibility in a criminal
trial, there is·"no adequate basis in reason or authority" 5 for a distinction between evidence which is contraband and that which is property lawfully in the
possession of the defendant. 6 People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., (N.Y. 1943)
51 N.E. (2d) 690.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF WRITING EXPRESSIVE OF PAST KNOWLEDGE-In a contract action for money allegedly lent defendant's intestate, plaintiff, while testifying, "refreshed his memory" from a "little red diary" in which
he kept informal accounts, including one with the defendant's intestate. After
cross examination, plaintiff's attorney offered the book in evidence and it was
admitted over the exception of the defendant. Held, exception overruled, but
only because the defendant was unable to show that he was harmed, the evidence
being merely cumulative. On the merits of the ruling the supreme court refused •
to agree with the decision below. The rule in this jurisdiction is that, unless
admissible on other grounds, a writing which. revives the witness's recollection
may not even be shown· to the jury, but the testimony must be to the fact as the
witness remembers it; and a writing which is a record of past knowledge may be
read or shown to the jury, at the judge's discretion, and may be adopted by the
witness as his testimony, but it may not be admitted in evidence. Here the evidence was clearly not admissible on -any other ground. Bendett v. Bendett,

(Mass. 1943) 52 ~.E. (2d) 2.
FEDERAL CouRTS-REMOVAL OF CAusEs-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT
-PROVISION THAT Surr MAY BE MAINTAINED IN ANY CoURT DoEs NoT
AFFECT RIGHT TO REMOVAL UNDER REMOVAL STATUTE-The plaintiff's
action to recover wages, overtime compensation and liquidated damages under
the Fair Labor Standards Act was brought in a state court and removed to the
federal_district court at the instance of the defendant. Plaintiff moved to remand
the case to a state court, raising the question whether the right of removal under
section 28 of the Judicial Code 1 is preluded by the provision of section I 6 (b) of
the-Fair Labor Standards Act 2 which authorizes an action of this character to be
"maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction." The plaintiff argues that
(I) there being a divergence of judicial opinion on the subject, the rule should
be applied that substantial doubt as to jurisdiction of a removed i:ase should be
resolved in favor of remand; and that ( 2) since state and federal courts are
242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926).
Principal case at p. 693.
6 The court deals also with the problem of the effect of previous interpretation of
a statute after the statute has been made a part of the constitution.
4

5

1

-

2

28 u.s.c. (1940) § 71.
29 U.S.C. (1940) § 216(b).
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vested with concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under the laws
of the United States except where Congress has expressly limited jurisdiction to
the federal courts, the provision of the act authorizing actions thereunder to be
"maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction" is superfluous and without
significance unless it be interpreted as intended to amend or repeal pro tanto the
Removal Statute.
Held, motion to remand denied. The rule that substantial-doubt as to jurisdiction should be abrogated in favor of remand is not applicable, where the decision on the motion, as here, requires interpretation of an Act of Congress. It is
necessary to say that section 16 (b) of the F afr Labor Standards Act abrogates
the right of removal in order to give it effect, for that section makes an employer
liable to his employee for unpaid wages, for an "additional equal amount" and for
"a reasonable attorney's fee," and section 256 of the Judicial Code 8 vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of the United States "of all suits for penalties and
forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States." "By explicitly providing for concurrent jurisdiction of state courts it was obviously the purpose of
Congress to dissipate any doubt as to the right and duty of state courts to entertain jurisdiction of suits arising under the Act, even though the extra recovery
authorized should be judicially determined to be in the nature of a penalty within
the meaning of Section 256 of the Judicial Code." 4 Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co.,
(U.S.D.C. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 432. 5
GRAND JuRY--SYsTEMATIC ExcLusroN OF WoMEN FROM GRAND JURY
As GROUND FOR QUASHING INDICTMEN'I'--Defendant was indicted by a grand
jury selected by the clerk, his deputies and the several jury commissioners of the
Federal District Court of Iowa. He moved to quash the indictment on the
ground that women had been "arbitrarily, purposefully, intentionally, systematically and entirely excluded" from the jury. Held, motion sustained.1 Jurors in
federal district courts are to be selected according to the law of the state where
each is located. 2 Persons eligible for selection in Iowa are those qualified to vote,8
including women, by decision of the Iowa courts since adoption of the Nineteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Though there is no constitutional provision prohibiting one sex from being excluded, and little authority on the point,
28 U.S.C. (1940) § 5n.
Principal case at p. 484.
5 See "Removal of Employer Suits under the Fair Labor Standards Act," 36 ILL.
L. REV. 787-791 (1942), and "Removal of Employer Suits under the Fair Labor
Standards Act," 26 MINN. L. REv. 134-135 (1941).
8

4

1 The court first decided that where, as here, the defendant had not,had an opportunity to challenge the regulation of the selection earlier, a motion to quash the indictment was timely.
2 "Jurors to serve in the courts of the United States, in each state respectively, shall
have the same qualifications, subject to the provisions, hereinafter contained, and be en:.
titled to the same exemptions, as jurors of the highest court of law in such state may have
and be entitled to at the time when such jurors for service in the court of the United
States are summoned." 28 U.S.C.A. (1928) §§ 411, 412, 419. Jud. Code § 275.
8 Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 10842.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

this court will follow the dictum in Glasser 'll. United States 4 where it was said
that the proper function of the jury requires that it be a body representative of the
community, and, though the selecting body may exercise its discretion to select
competent jurors, it cannot do so to the exclusion of a whole class or group in the
community. To exclude women from jury service is exclusion of half of the
population and amounts to discrimination suaicient to sustain a motion to quash
the indictment. United States 'll. Roeming, (U.S.D.C. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 857.
LABOR-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-EFFECT OF FRAUD IN PROCURING VoTE OF EMPLOYEE FOR UNION BARGAINING AGENT--The N.L.
R.B. petitioned this court for an order enforcing its own "cease and desist"
order which. directed respondent to bargain with a local union of the C.I.O.
Respondent objects that the C.I.O. local was never duly elected as bargaining
agent since, in the election held under the auspices of the board, four votes needed
. for the union's majority were obtained by fraud, and the consent of the four
voters is thereby vitiated .. Four employees testified that one Capra, an employee
organizing for the union, obtained their votes by telling them, in effect, that
if they did not join the union, they could not work there any more. The board
decided that though this was the fact it was irrelevant to the issue of the union's
right to act as a bargaining representative. Held, petition denied and order to
cease and desist set aside. If the consequences threatened were not a truthful
statement of what might follow if the employee refused to join the union, they
amounted to fraud. "Fraud ..• will vitiate consent as well as violence, and the
Board itself implies that a vote procured by violence should not be counted .•.
Section seven 1 confers the right on all employees freely to choose their bargaining representatives and the invasion of that right is as much a wrong when
committed by a union organizer as by an employer." 2 To be truthful the consequences stated by Capra should have been stated as conditioned upon the union's
getting control; being unconditional, however, they amounted to fraud and,
under the act, invalidated the votes.
It is immaterial that there was no proof of Capra's authority to act for the
union since, whether authorized or not, the effect on the rights of employees was
the same. National Labor Relations Board 'l/. Dadourian Export Corp., (C.C.A.
2d, ~943) 138 F. (2d) 891.3
•
LABOR-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL
COURT TO INQUIRE INTO CONSENT ELECTION ,IN ABSENCE OF ALLEGATION
OF USUAL GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION-The Sun Ship Employees Association,
Inc., an independent union, Local No. 2, C.I.O., and the employer entered into
an agreement to hold a consent election to determine the appropriate bargaining
agent for employees-of the company. The agreement provided that the election
"be held in accordance with the Act, the Rules and Regulation, and the customary procedures and policies of the Board," that "the determi~ation of the Re4

315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942).

.

'

49 Stat. L. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 157.
2 Principal case at p. 892. ,
3 Principal case noted in 57 HARV. L. REv. 386 (1944).
1
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gional Director shall be final and binding upon any question . . . relating . . .
to the election and not specifically covered in this agreement," and that the election be conducted under the direction and supervision of the regional director.
The election was held under this agreement, and after ruling on several
disputes arising out of it, the regional director' decided that Local No. 2, C.I.O.
was the duly elected bargaining agent. The N.L.R.B. refused to hear objections
to this ruling in the petition of the association, and thereupon, the association
brought this action against it complaining of the conduct of the election. It
alleged that the federal court has jurisdiction on the basis of the statute providing
for suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce, here the
National Labor Relations Act. 1 The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction and an appeal was taken. Held, affirmed. The contract providing for the
election was an ordinary private agreement. Although it was executed on a form
provided by the board, it was neither imposed by a public body, statute or regulation, nor did it derive its vitality from these sources. The fact that the regional
director was to conduct the election is not significant for the agreement might as
well have provided that some other reputable citizen act in that capacity. Since
this is then a suit for the breach of a private contract, it must be subjected to the
usual test for federal jurisdiction. Sun Ship Employees Association, Inc. v. Notional Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 3rd, 1943) 139 F. (2d) 744. 2
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-WHETHER STATUTE ,AFFECTING MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS OF STATE-WIDE CONCERN TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER HOME
RULE CHARTER PROVISION-The city of Grand IslaIJd brought a condemnation
proceeding under a -state statute 1 to acquire certain property within the city for
park purposes. Sally Nagle, owner of part of the property, appealed from the
award of the appraisers to the district court, and the city appeals from the order of
the district court dismissing the action. The question is whether the proceeding
should have been brought under the charter provisions 2 in the city's home rule
charter, or whether condemnation is a matter of such state-wide concern that the
state legislation takes precedence over the provisions of the home rule charter.
Held, reversed. The Constitution of Nebraska provides that a home rule charter
must be consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state.8
Home rule cities may exercise all the powers connected with a proper and
efficient government but subject to the general laws of the state in all but matters of strictly local concern. Condemnation, by reason of the fact that it may
affect everyone in the matter of ownership of property and the compensation he
is to receive, is a matter of state-wide importance. The provision in the city
28 U.S.C.A. (1927) § 41(1).
See 91 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 265 (1942) for a case in which the New York Supreme Court in 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 156 (1942) denied a petition to enforce a voluntary
arbitration agreement for arbitration by the New York Board of Mediation on the
ground that such procedure conflicts with the war policy of the federal government.
1

'2

Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) § 16-602.
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) § 74-301.
3 Neb. Const., art. I 1, § 2 (1875).

1
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charter, therefore, must yield to the statute. Nagle v. City of Grand Island,
(Neb. 1943) 12 N.W. (2d) 540.4
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-WHETHER ERROR IN BRINGING SUIT TO
ANNUL INFANT'S MARRIAGE IN NAME OF NEXT FRIEND rs FATAL-Maude
Kirby brought an action "in her own right and as next friend of Lois May Kirby
Gilliam, an infant" to procure the annullment of the "marriage or purported
marriage" of her infant daughter with defendant. Defendant demurred and
the circuit court sustained the demurrer. On appeal, held, affirmed, without
prejudice to the right of the next friend to file in the name of the infant. Under
the Virginia statute 1 "an fofant wife cannot bring suit ~n her own name to
annul her marriage" but must sue by her next friend. A suit on her behalf must
be brought in her name by her next friend, and if it is not so brought, the
plaintiff may not amend but is nonsuited because a suit must be brought by one
whose interests are involved and the next friend has no interest as a litigant.
One justice dissented on the ground that, since the infant was clearly the real
party in interest, the defect was purely formal and should have been corrected by
amendment. Kirby v. Gilliam, (Va. 1943) 28 S.E. (2d)_ 40.
PRocEss-CAN PLAINTIFF's ATTORNEY AcT As PRocEss SERVER UNDER
WASHINGTON STATUTE?-Appellants had a default judgment rendered against
them in a suit on two promissory notes, and petitioned to have it set aside on the
ground that the service was void. The Washington statute provides that "In all
cases except wh~n service is made by publication ... the summons shall be served
by the sheriff of the county wherein the service is made or by his deputy, or by
-any person over twenty-on~ years of age, who is competent to be a witness in
the action, other than the plaintiff." 1 Appellants contend that "other than the
plaintiff" was intended to include all persons interested in the outcome of thecase, thereby excluding the appellee's attorney. The trial court denied appellant's
petition to vacate the judgment. Held, affirmed. Following a Minnesota decision 2 summons is not process but only notice to the defendant that proceedings
have been instituted and judgment will be rendered against him unless he defends. Such summons may be made by a private person unless the statute otherwise provides. Appellee's attorney is not excluded from eligibility to serve by
the Washington statute. Roth v. Nash, (Wash. 1943) 144 P. (2d) 271.
TAXATION-EXEMPTION OF CHARITABLE RESIDUE WHEN TRUSTEE HAS
PowER TO INVADE IT FOR LIFE-TENANT-Testator provided in his will for
the residue of his estate to be held in trust, the income to go to his wife for life
and the principal, except $100,000, to go to certain charities. Trustee was given
4 On· municipal powers in general see "Construction of Municipal Powers," 28
lowA L. REv. 109 (1942).

1 Va. Code· (1942) § 5331. "Any minor entitled to sue may do so by his next
friend."

1
2

Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, l 9 3 l) § 2 2 5.
First Natl. Bank of Whitewater v. Estenson, 68 Minn. 28, 70 N.W. 775 (1897).
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the power, under the will, to invade the principal if it shall "in its sole discretion
deem wise and proper for the comfort, support, maintenance and for happiness
of my said wife," and the testator -expressed the wish in the will that the discretion be exercised "with liberality." The trustee, petitioner here in filing estate
and income tax returns, attempted to deduct the estimated amount which would ·
ultimately go to charity from the gross estate, under§ 303 (a) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1926; 1 and the gains received from a sale of securities from the 1937
income under § 162 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1936.2 The commissioner of
Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions; on petition for review, the Board
of Tax Appeals allowed them, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Board of
Tax Appeals. On certiorari this court held, affirmed. Implementing § 303
(a) (3), the Treasury Regulations provide that where a trust is created for both
charitable and private purposes the charitable bequest, to be deductible, must have,
at the testator's death, a value "presently ascertainable, and hence severable from
the interest in favor of private use," and where the trustee has a power to divert
the property from the charity, "deduction will be limited to that portion, if any
of the property or fund which is exempt from the exercise of such power." 3
Congress and the Treasury require a highly reliable appraisal of the amount that
the charity will receive, and the burden is on the taxpayer to show that "the
extent of the invasion of the corpus depends upon some readily ascertainable and
reliably predictable facts" 4 and are thus accurately calculable. The showing of
petitioner that testator's widow was sixty-seven years of age, had a substantial
independent income, and no dependent children, and that the laws of Massachusetts, where the will was made and property existed, might restrict the
trustee's discretion, did not sustain this burden of proof. The case is distinguished
from Ithaca Trust Co. 'lJ. United States 6 in that there the extent to which the
principal might be withrawn was limited to the maintenance of the widow's
prior way of life. The income deductions were also not permissible since section
162 permits deductions of only that part of the gross income which is "permanently set aside for charity." Merchants' National Bank 'lJ. Commissioner of
Internal Re'!Jenue, (U.S. 1943) 64 S. Ct. 108.
TAXATION-WHETHER ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN UNSUCCESSFULLY CONTESTING PosTMAsTER's FRAUD ORDER ARE "ORDINARY AND
NECESSARY" BusINESS EXPENSES-Respondent was a dentist engaged in the
business of selling false tee!h by mail. In filing income tax returns for I 9 3 7 and
1938 he sought to deduct from his gross income attorney's fees and other legal
expenses incurred in unsuccessfully contesting the Postmaster General's fraud
order which forbade the Postmaster of Chicago to pay money orders drawn to
respondent, and directed that all letters addressed to him be marked "Fraudulent" and returned to the sender. Respondent claimed these deductions on the
theory that under section 23(a) of the Revenue Acts'of 1936 and• 1938, such
44 Stat. L. 72 (1926).
49 Stat. L. 1706 (1936).
3 80 Treasury Regulations (1937) art. 44 (U.S. Office of the Department of Internal Revenue).
4 Principal case at 58.
5 279 U.S. 151, 49 S. Ct. 291 (1929).
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expenses were "ordinary and necessary" expenses· incurred in carrying on his
business.1 The Tax Commissioner denied the deductions on the ground that the
expenses were not ordinary and necessary to respondent's business. The Board
of Tax Appeals affirmed,2 and the circuit court reversed and remanded. 3 On
certiorari, held, affirmed. Giyen their commonly accepted meaning, "ordinary
and necessary" cover these expenses. "For respondent to employ a lawyer to
defend his business from threatened destruction was 'normal'; it was the response
ordinarily to be expected. . . . Since the record contains no suggestion that the
defense was in bad faith or that the attorney's fees were unreasonable, the expense
incurred in defending the business can also be assumed appropriate and helpful,
and therefore 'nec(lssary'." 4
The argume,nt that dentists in the mail order business do not ordinarily and
necessarily attempt to sell false teeth by fraudulent representations, and that, this
dentist having done so, he cannot claim his litigation expenses as "ordinary and
necessary" is not controlling. The fraud order threatened not only respondent's
selling methods, but also the existence of his lawful business; under our system
of jurisprudence he was not bound to believe that "a fraud order destroying his
business was justified by the facts or the law."
It is not necessary here, as in some cases, to narrow the meaning of section
2 3 (a) "in order that tax deduction consequences might not frustrate. sharply
defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct." The
single policy of the act under which the order was issued 5 is to protect the public
from fraudulent practices committed through the mails, not to punish the individual offender, nor to discourage him' from employing counsel. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 64 S. Ct. 249 (1943). 6
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF HOCKEY RINK OPERATOR FOR INJURY TO SPECTATOR BY FLYING PucK-A spectator at a hockey game, having
. voluntarily seated herself in an unscreened box at the side of the rink, was struck
by a flying puck and injured thereby. She brought action to recover damages
from the operator of the rink on the ground that it was negligent in failing to
screen the box, and in not warning the spectators of the danger of flying pucks.
The jury in the district court, under instructions from the court, brought in a
verdict for the plaintiff and the operator appeals, contending that: (I) a verdict
\

Revenue Act of 1936, c. 690, 49 Stat. L. 1658.
"Section 23. Deduction from Gross Income.
"In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
"(a) Expenses.-All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . . ."
Section 23 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1938, c. 289, 52 Stat. L. 460, is identical
with Section 23 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1936.
2 47 B.T.A. 95 (1942).
3 133 F. (2d) 567 (1943).
4 Principal case at p. 252.
5 39 u.s.c. (1940) §§ 259, 732.
6 Principal case noted in 57 HARV. L. REv. 109 (1943). See also "Deduction of
Business Expenses: Illegality and Public Policy," 54 HARV. L. REv. 8 52 ( l 941) and
· "Deductibility of Attorney's Fees From Gross Income," 28 lowA L. REv. 97 (1942).
1
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should have been directed in its favor on the evidence that it had acted in conformity with the custom and approved methods of prudent ice rink operators, and
in so acting, was not negligent; (2) a verdict should have been directed in its
favor on the ground that, as in baseball, knowledge of the risks of danger incident to the game is imputable to all spectators and, as a matter of law, they
assume those risks; and (3) the jury was improperly instructM that the appellee
assumed only those risks of which she was aware, and was not instructed, as it '
should have been, as to the duties of the appellee under the defense of contributory negligence. Held, reversed. The operator of a hockey rink is not an insurer, but owes to its patrons the duty of reasonable care to protect them from
dangers of which they are unaware, and of which they have not assumed the
risk. The customs of the business are not an absolute test of what constitutes
reasonable care, but were properly submitted to the jury as evidence of reasonable
care. The spectators assume the risks incident to the game when they know or
reasonably-should know of them, and the jury should have been so instructed,
but knowledge of such risks is not imputable to spectators in hockey as in baseball,
for·the reason that the risks incident to hockey cannot be said to be so much a
matter of common knowledge. The jury should have been further instructed
that it was the duty of the spectator to use reasonable care to protect herself from
known dangers and dangers of which a reasonable person would have been
aware. Tite v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, (Neb. 1943) 12 N.W. (2d) 90.
WILLS-EFFECT OF A SALE OF DEVISED LAND BY TESTATOR WHO
TAKES BACK A PURCHASE MoNEY MORTGAGE-This action was brought by
the administrator against the residuary legatee and others for the construction
.of the will of Frances Foulk. Testatrix, in her will, devised equal shares in
an undivided one-half interest in certain land to three of the defendants. She
made Mayrell Mary Thompson residuary legatee. Shortly thereafter she
executed a conveyance of the interest devised in the will and received therefor cash in the amount of $439.88 and a note with a mortgage to secure it.
The trial court awarded the cash plus the note and mortgage to the devisees and the court of appeals reversed this decision. On appeal to the
supreme court, held, affirmed. It is provided by statute that when a testator
makes a conveyance of land already bequeathed or devised, it shall not be deemed
a revocation of the bequest, but the bequest shall pass the actual estate or interest
of the testator which might have gone to his heirs at law. But if the provisions
of the instrument by which the alteration is accomplished are wholly inconsistent
with the previous devise, so long as it is not conditional then the devise is revoked.1 Thus if a partial interest of the subject of the devise is subsequently disposed of, the will is effective as to the remaining interest; but where the whole
title 1s conveyed away, as here, the devise is wholly nullified. The mortgage
executed by the grants was a mere security for the note given for the balance of
the purchase pric~. Lewis v. Thompson, (Ohio 1943) 52 N.E. (2d) 331.2
1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page 1938) §§ 10504-51, 10504-52.
2
See 17 TENN. L. REv. 960 (1943) for a case when stock was bequeathed by
will and testator later sold the stock to the devisee, who gave promissory notes for it.
In a suit to cancel the unpaid notes after the death of testator, court held for plaintiff.

